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Private Party Recovery of Environmental 
Response Costs 
James R. Haisley· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Owners of sites contaminated by hazardous waste, 
neighbors of such sites, and other private parties may be faced 
with enormous costs associated with environmental cleanups, 
regardless of whether they had any direct involvement in the 
waste disposal activities. Increasingly, parties that are not 
responsible for these environmental harms, or, only partially at 
fault, are seeking to recover the costs of environmental cleanup 
from other responsible parties. 
An action to recover environmental response costs may 
arise under various situations. Private parties may find 
themselves liable for cleaning up hazardous waste pursuant to 
a government order, or may choose to cleanup contaminated 
property voluntarily because such contamination is inconsistent 
with present uses of the property. Property owners may also 
seek to recover the costs associated with cleaning up a release 
or threatened release from adjacent land which threatens to 
contaminate their nearby property. Because the presence of 
hazardous waste is often difficult to detect, purchasers, lenders, 
and other parties to real estate transactions may also find 
themselves facing enormous liability and look for others to 
share in the cleanup costs. 
Private recovery of such response costs may be available 
under federal and state statutes, as well as common law 
theories of nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability. 
Recovery may also be available under certain insurance 
policies. The purpose of this article is to provide a brief 
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overview of the various statutory and common law theories 
authorizing private recovery, the scope of available relief, and 
potential defenses. 
II. STATUTORY SOURCES FOR RECOVERY OF RESPONSE COSTS 
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 
By far, the most comprehensive and widely used statutory 
mechanism for private recovery of environmental response 
costs arises under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 1 
Section 107 of CERCLA specifically provides that any person 
who can demonstrate that the release of a hazardous sub-
stance2 has caused it to incur response costs, may recover 
those necessary response costs from other parties whom the 
statute holds liable. 3 Response costs are broadly defined to 
include removal and remedial action, and enforcement activi-
ties related thereto.4 
1. Potentially Liable Parties 
Section 107 of CERCLA permits any person who has in-
curred response costs as a result of a release of hazardous 
substances to recover those costs from four classes of poten-
tially responsible parties (PRPs). These "responsible parties" 
include: (1) Current owners and/or operators of facilities at 
which a hazardous substance release is occurring or is threat-
ened; (2) persons who owned and/or operated a facility at the 
time of disposal of any hazardous substance;5 (3) persons who 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1989) (all subsequent citations to 42 U.S.C. refer to 
1989). 
2. "Hazardous substances" are defined by CERCLA to include most RCRA 
hazardous waste and other hazardous or toxic substances identified or listed under 
CERCLA, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and other identified federal 
statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4). 
4. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(25). 
5. "Owner or Operator" is defined by CERCLA to include persons owning or 
operating a facility, and transporters of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 
9601(20). This defmition specifically excludes persons who hold an indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect a security interest, but have no participation in the 
management of a facility. However, a lender or other secured party which has even 
minimal involvement in management of a facility may be liable as an owner. See 
Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 
1988); U.S. v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
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arranged for the disposal, treatment, or transportation of any 
hazardous substance to a disposal or treatment facility; and ( 4) 
persons who accept or accepted any hazardous substance for 
transportation to a disposal or treatment facility. 6 Courts 
which have attempted to interpret this provision of CERCLA 
have determined that lessors;7 corporate officers, directors and 
employees;8 parent corporations;9 successor corporations;10 
and secured creditors which have participated in the day-to-day 
operational management of a site or facility may also be poten-
tially responsible parties. 11 
2. Prima Facie Case 
The necessary elements for establishing liability in a pri-
vate party cost recovery action have been defined by several 
court decisions. 12 To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff 
must prove that: (1) The defendant is an "owner or operator" or 
otherwise falls within one of the four categories of covered 
persons listed in section 107(a); (2) the defendant caused a 
"release"13 or threatened release of a hazardous substance into 
the environment; (3) the release or threatened release occurred 
at a "facility";14 ( 4) the release or threatened release has 
6. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1-4). 
7. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2nd Cir. 
1985); U.S. v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 747-48 (W.D. Mich. 
1987), affd sub nom., U.S. v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990). 
8. U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743-
44 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
at 1052-53; Kelley v. ARCO Industr. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (W.D. Mich. 
1989); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-832 (D. Vt. 1988), vacated in 
part, 1989 WL 225428 (D. Vt. 1989). 
9. U.S. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22-23 (D.R.I. 1989), affd, 910 
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); Rockwell Int'l. Corp. v. 
IU Int1. Corp., 702 F.Supp. 1384, 1391-92 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Idaho v. The Bunker 
Hill Co., 635 F.Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986). 
10. U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1039 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
11. See, e.g., U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
12. See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 
1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2014 (1991); Dedham Water Co. 
v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989); Artesian Water 
Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1278-79 (D. Del. 1987), affd, 851 
F.2d 643 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
13. A "release" is defined broadly to include "any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or 
disposing into the environment," subject to certain exceptions. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(22). 
14. The term "facility" means any building, structure, installation, equipment, 
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caused a party to incur response costs; (5) the response costs 
are necessary; and (6) the response costs are consistent with 
the National Contingency Plan (NCP). 15 
3. Scope of Recoverable Response Costs 
The remedies available to private parties under CERCLA 
include recovery of response costs and declaratory relief. Re-
sponse costs include past costs incurred in removal or 
remediation of a contaminated site. 16 Although courts are gen-
erally reluctant to award future response costs, they may grant 
declaratory relief for the recovery of future costs once those 
costs have been incurred. 17 
Removal and remediation are specifically defined in 
CERCLA. Removal activities include investigation of a release, 
cleanup or removal of hazardous substances, disposal of re-
moved material, and other actions necessary to minimize dam-
age to the public health, welfare or environment. 18 Removal 
activities are generally intended as temporary measures. 
Remediation, on the other hand, is intended to provide a more 
permanent remedy in lieu of, or in addition to, a removal ac-
tion. Remediation generally includes action taken to prevent or 
minimize the release of hazardous substances so they do not 
migrate and endanger the public health or the environment. 19 
Recent court opinions have provided additional clarification 
of these definitions and identified the following as recoverable 
costs under the general parameters of "response costs." 
pipe or pipeline, well, pit, impoundment, storage container, vehicle, or any site or 
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, or disposed of, but 
does not include any consumer product in consumer use. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). 
15. The NCP is promulgated by the EPA order to "establish procedures and 
standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and 
contaminants ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The NCP is intended to provide guidance 
for cleanup actions and shall address the methods for investigating facilities, 
methods for evaluating a release or threatened release, criteria for determining 
appropriate removal and remedial measures, roles for government and non-govern-
ment entities, and means for assuring cost-effectiveness. !d. The provisions of the 
NCP dealing with CERCLA were first promulgated in 1982. The NCP was revised 
in 1985 and again in 1990. The revised NCP is now codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300 
(1990). 
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). 
17. Williams v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. 
Ohio 1988). 
18. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(23). 
19. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(24). 
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a. Preliminary Investigative Costs. The first step in any 
response action is to investigate and assess the extent of con-
tamination. CERCLA specifically includes within the definition 
of "removal" "such actions as may be necessary to monitor, 
assess, and evaluate the release or threatened release of haz-
ardous substances."2° Courts have generally held that on-site 
testing and investigative costs fall within this definition.21 
This may be true even if a party has not yet begun a cleanup. 
However, costs incurred before learning of the contamination or 
for other purposes such as an environmental audit in connec-
tion with a purchase of the property, are not recoverable.22 
b. Cleanup Costs Associated With Removal and 
Remediation. Given the intent of CERCLA and the statutory 
definition of removal and remediation, courts generally have 
little difficulty in concluding that the term response costs 
should include a broad range of cleanup activities. 23 This may 
include costs associated with cleanup activities such as removal 
and disposal of contaminated soil, containers and materials; 
storage; confinement; neutralization; construction of fencing, 
dikes or ditches; repair or replacement of leaking containers; 
and treatment or incineration.24 
c. Public Health and Welfare. Response costs may also in-
clude those measures necessary to protect or minimize the risk 
or damage to the public health and welfare. CERCLA specifi-
cally includes as remedial costs expenses in connection with 
"security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of 
alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing 
of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for ... [and 
other emergency disaster relie£].'>25 
One issue which has been frequently litigated involves 
20. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(23). 
21. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 
1575 (5th Cir. 1988); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); 
Emhart Industr., Inc. v. Duracell Int1, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549, 574 (M.D. Tenn. 
1987). 
22. See Pennsylvania Urban Dev. Corp. v. Golen, 708 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989) 
23. See Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063 (M.D. Pa. 1988). 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24-25); see, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 
664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 
(E.D. Pa. 1988). 
25. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(23). 
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recovery of response costs in connection with contamination of 
water supplies. Under CERCLA, a party may recover the costs 
associated with providing an alternative water supply,26 but 
there is some uncertainty as to whether a party can recover for 
the loss of use of existing wells. 27 Similarly, when a private 
party is seeking additional water supplies which are not "neces-
sary" remedial costs, recovery may be denied. 28 
Other costs relating to public health and welfare include 
expenses for medical testing, screening and/or monitoring. 
Courts are split on the extent to which these costs are recov-
erable. In Brewer v. Ravan,29 the court concluded that medical 
expenses incurred in the treatment of personal injuries or dis-
eases caused by a release of hazardous substances are not 
recoverable. 30 Nevertheless, the court awarded the costs of 
medical testing and screening "to assess the effect of the re-
lease or discharge on the public health or to identify potential 
public health problems presented by the release."31 Other 
courts have taken a contrary view and concluded that even 
costs related to medical screening and/or monitoring are not 
"necessary costs of response," and therefore not recoverable. 32 
d. Relocation and Evacuation. CERCLA specifically provides 
for recovery of costs associated with the temporary evacuation 
and housing of threatened individuals.33 Recovery of costs for 
permanent relocation of residents and businesses is also avail-
able "where the President determines that, alone or in combi-
nation with other matters, such relocation is more cost-effective 
than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, 
storage, treatment, destruction, or secured disposition offsite of 
26. Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1287 (D. Del. 
1987). 
27. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (court 
concluded that response costs include the loss of use of wells for drinking water); 
but see Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (loss of wells 
more appropriately characterized as natural resources damages and are not "re-
sponse costs" for purposes of cost recovery). 
28. See Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1287. 
29. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
30. !d. at 1179. 
31. !d.; see also, Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370, 376 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1985); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. at 1429-30. 
32. See Lutz, 718 F. Supp. at 418; Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651, 
652-53 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23); see also, Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles 
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect 
the public health or welfare .... "34 In the absence of such a 
finding, permanent relocation costs are not recoverable.35 
e. Attorney Fees. Legal costs and attorney fees in a CERCLA 
action can be substantial. Courts are divided on whether or not 
these fees are recoverable. Some courts have awarded costs and 
attorney fees as enforcement activities related to a response ac-
tion.36 Other courts attempt to distinguish between govern-
ment and non-government enforcement costs and allowed gov-
ernment recovery of costs and attorney fees, but deny recovery 
to private litigants.37 Finally, at least one court allowed pri-
vate parties to recover legal costs and fees associated with 
investigating and negotiating response activities, but denied 
costs and fees of litigation to recover response costs or other 
"enforcement expenses."38 
f. Costs Not Recoverable. A private party generally cannot 
recover damages in an action brought under section 107 of 
CERCLA. Damages which are not recoverable include: 
(1) Business losses or economic drunages;39 
(2) Diminution in property value;40 
(3) Expenses incurred in connection with personal injuries;41 
and 
(4) Punitive damages.42 
4. Consistency with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) 
A private party can recover the costs of removal or 




42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
T&E Industries,· Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 707 (D.N.J. 
36. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Industr. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 
1415, 1421-1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1390 (1991); Pease & 
Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Shapiro v. 
Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
37. T&E Industries, 680 F. Supp. at 707-708. 
38. BCW Associates, Ltd. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 1988 WL 102641 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 29, 1988) (No. Civ. A. 86-5947). 
39. Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339, 
1348 (E.D. Va. 1986). 
40. Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1988); 
Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
41. Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn 1988). 
42. Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 151-52 (D.R.I. 1989). 
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the NCP.43 A party seeking recovery bears the burden of prov-
ing consistency. Because a removal action is generally taken in 
response to an immediate threat, the NCP's procedural require-
ments are less stringent for removal than remedial actions. 
Section 300.415 of the NCP sets forth the factors to be consid-
ered in determining the propriety of a removal action. These 
regulations include a list of precautions, controls and contain-
ment actions that may be appropriate. 44 
The NCP requirements for a remedial action are more 
stringent than those for removal. The NCP requires a prelimi-
nary site assessment, followed by preparation of a Remedial 
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RifFS) that assesses the site 
and appropriate remedies.45 The private party must then se-
lect an appropriate and cost effective remedy and provide an 
opportunity for public comment on the alternatives. 
It is often difficult to determine whether response costs are 
consistent with the NCP. Prior to 1990, courts were divided as 
to the appropriate standard to apply in determining consisten-
cy.46 In 1990, the EPA amended the NCP to end the confu-
sion. The NCP now provides that a "private party response 
action will be considered 'consistent with the NCP' if the action, 
when evaluated as a whole, is in substantial compliance with 
the applicable requirements ... [of the NCP] and results in a 
CERCLA-quality cleanup."47 
As a practical matter, a private party should consider ob-
taining the EPA's approval before incurring any response costs. 
Although not a prerequisite to recovery,48 The EPA's approval 
may minimize disagreement between parties and enhance the 
opportunity for cost recovery. This advantage must be weighed 
against the risk that the EPA's approval will delay completion 
and increase the costs of the cleanup. 
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
44. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415 (1991). 
45. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.420 to 300.435 (1991). 
46. Compare Amland Properties Corp. v. Alcoa, 711 F. Supp. 784, 796-97 (D. 
N.J. 1989) (strict compliance with NCP not required); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. 
Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1579-83 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (site assessment not 
consistent with NCP). 
47. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (emphasis added). 
48. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
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5. Apportionment of Liability I Contribution 
a. Joint and Several Liability. Liability under CERCLA 
is joint and several.49 However, a court may apportion liabili-
ty, particularly in a private party action, if defendants can 
prove that such a division of costs is appropriate. 
In seeking apportionment, the moving party bears the 
burden of proving that the harm is divisible. Divisibility of 
harm and apportionment may be evaluated by looking to a 
variety of equitable factors. Most courts have relied upon the 
so-called Gore Factors in evaluating the appropriateness of 
apportionment. 5° These factors include: 1) the volume of waste 
contributed; 2) the toxicity of waste; 3) the extent to which a 
party's contribution is distinguishable from other parties; 4) the 
relative degree of care exercised by the parties; and 5) the 
degree of cooperation in cleanup.51 
If the harm is not divisible, each party may be joint and 
severally liable and responsible for all cleanup costs.52 Simi-
larly, if the government is involved, courts may hesitate to 
apportion liability among private parties, and may instead 
require that the parties seek contribution among them-
selves.53 
b. Contribution. Prior to the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), there was some doubt as 
to whether CERCLA provided for recovery by contribution. 
With the passage of SARA, CERCLA now provides that any 
person may seek contribution from another person who is liable 
or potentially liable under section 107(a), and a court may 
"allocate response costs among liable parties using such equita-
49. See, e.g., Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. 
Okla. 1987). 
50. The Gore Factors refer to criteria named after a sponsor of an amendment 
to the original 1980 CERCLA bill. The amendment would have provided consider-
ations upon which to disallow joint and several liability in appropriate cases. 
Although the amendment failed, the factors have been considered by courts in 
determining the appropriateness of apportionment. 
51. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86-87 (D. Me. 1988), 
affd sub nom., Travelers lndem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1116-17 (N.D. 
Ill. 1988). 
52. Allied Corp., 691 F. Supp. at 1116. 
53. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1115 (1990); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988). 
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ble factors as the court determines are appropriate."54 These 
"equitable factors" are similar to those discussed above in con-
sidering apportionment. 
Although the distinctions between an action under section 
107 and a contribution claim are often blurred, some important 
differences exist. These include: 
(1) The only prerequisite to a contribution claim is 
that a plaintiff have a claim against another party with whom 
it shares CERCLA liability, as opposed to the numerous ele-
ments for a prima facie case under section 107 outlined above; 
(2) By definition, a contribution action presumes ap-
portionment is necessary and appropriate; 
(3) A contribution action may offer a wider scope of 
recoverable costs; 
( 4) A contribution action may offer a wider range of 
equitable defenses; and 
(5) The applicable statute of limitations may differ 
depending upon the type of action brought. 
6. Defenses 
Defenses to CERCLA are limited. Under section 107, the 
only circumstances under which an otherwise responsible party 
can avoid liability is by establishing that the release or threat-
ened release was caused solely by: 
(1) An act of God;55 
(2) An act of war; 
(3) An act or omission of a third party other than an 
employee or agent of the defendant, or one whose act or omis-
sion occurs in connection with a contractual relationship with 
the defendant, and where a) the defendant exercised due care 
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and b) the de-
fendant took prec·autions against such acts or omissions and 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). 
55. CERCLA defmes "act of God" as an "unanticipated grave natural disaster or 
other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, 
the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of 
due care or foresight." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1). Heavy rainfall, hurricanes, or even 
earthquakes are probably not acts of God if they are foreseeable and a private 
party could have taken measures to guard against the effects. See United States v. 
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (heavy rains not an act of 
God because they were foreseeable based upon normal climatic conditions and 
because the harm could have been prevented through design and installation of 
proper drainage channels). 
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the foreseeable results; or 
(4) Any combination of the above defenses. 56 
Of these defenses, the third-party defense, which also ap-
plies to "innocent landowners," is the most frequently used. To 
successfully assert the third-party defense, a party must prove 
that it had no contractual or other relationship with the third 
party causing the release, and that the third party was the sole 
cause of the environmental contamination. The defense re-
quires a showing that the discharge could not have been pre-
vented through the exercise of due care.57 Additionally, to in-
voke the innocent landowner defense, a party must demon-
strate that (1) it purchased the contaminated facility after the 
disposal of hazardous substances, and (2) after conducting all 
appropriate inquiry, it had no knowledge or reason to know 
that hazardous substances had been released or disposed of at 
the facility. 58 
In addition to the limited statutory defenses to a section 
107 action, a variety of common law defenses may be available 
in an action for contribution, including estoppel, unclean hands, 
laches, due care, and contract or other agreement. 
B. Oil Pollution Act 
Releases of petroleum are specifically excluded from cover-
age by CERCLA under the so-called "petroleum exclusion."59 
In an effort to establish a comprehensive liability scheme for oil 
spills and in response to the Exxon Valdez incident, Congress 
recently enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).60 The 
OPA contains language similar to the hazardous substance 
release provisions under CERCLA, but applies specifically to 
discharges or threatened discharges of oil into or on navigable 
waters, adjoining shoreline, or to the exclusive economic 
zone.61 
The scope of waters covered by the OPA is quite broad. 
EPA has defined "navigable waters" to include all interstate 
waters, and all waters which may be susceptible to or which 
could affect interstate or foreign commerce, including lakes, 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). 
57. See State v. Time Oil Co., 678 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) and (B). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 
60. 33 u.s.c. §§ 2701-2761. 
61. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
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streams, mud flats, wetlands, wet meadows, or natural 
ponds.62 This definition includes normally dry arroyos,63 as 
well as man-made waters.64 Given this broad definition, the 
OPA could have a significant impact on inland areas such as 
Utah. 
A party who is responsible for a vessel or facility65 from 
which oil is discharged, or which poses a substantial threat of 
discharge, into or upon navigable waters may be liable for 
removal costs and damages.66 Liability is strict, joint and sev-
eral. Removal costs may include the costs of containment and 
removal of oil or hazardous substances from water, or such 
other actions necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the 
public health or welfare. These costs may also include costs 
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate a substantial 
threat of a discharge of oil. 67 
Under the OPA, an owner or operator may recover from a 
third party that was the sole cause of a discharge, any removal 
costs which are consistent with the NCP, as well as damag-
es. 68 This language is substantially similar to CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B), but includes recovery of certain damages 
including the loss of real or personal property, loss of subsis-
tence use of natural resources, or loss of profits or earning 
capacity.69 
Responsible parties may also seek contribution from other 
persons who are liable or potentially liable. 70 Unlike 
CERCLA, the OPA does not direct what factors are to be ap-
plied in apportioning liability and instead a court must look to 
other applicable state and federal law. A contribution action 
62. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). 
63. Quivera Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). 
64. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1089 (1991). 
65. The OPA defines "responsible party" to include any person owning, operat-
ing, or· chartering a vessel; any person owning or operating a facility; the lessee or 
permittee of an offshore facility; a licensee of a deep water port; and any person 
owning or operating a pipeline. In the case of an abandoned vessel or facility, 
"responsible party" includes any person who would have been a responsible party 
immediately prior to the abandonment of the vessel or facility. 33 U.S.C. § 
2701(32). 
66. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
67. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(31). 
68. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(B) and (d)(1)(A). 
69. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2). 
70. 33 U.S.C. § 2709. 
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must be filed within three years of either payment of a claim or 
entry of a judgment or judicially approved settlement against 
the responsible party. 71 
Several defenses similar to those in CERCLA are also 
available under the OP A. For instance, a responsible party is 
not liable for removal costs or damages if it can demonstrate 
that the incident resulted solely from an act of God; an act of 
war; or an act or omission of a third party, other than an em-
ployee, agent, or party in a contractual relationship with the 
responsible party; or some combination of the above. 72 
C. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRAf3 
has often been described as "cradle to the grave" regulation of 
hazardous substances. The Act applies primarily to active facil-
ities and requires, among other things, that owners and opera-
tors of regulated facilities inspect and maintain the facility, 
remedy any deteriorations or malfunctions, and eventually 
close the facility to prevent or minimize the escape of hazard-
ous materials. RCRA also contains a citizens suit provision 
whereby "any person may commence a civil action on his own 
behalf ... against any person ... who has contributed or who 
is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous 
waste which may present an eminent or substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment .... "74 
The citizen suit provision has been widely interpreted to 
provide only injunctive relief and no cause of action for private 
damages.75 However, there is support for the proposition that 
an owner or operator of a RCRA facility may nonetheless recov-
er the costs of a RCRA mandated corrective action or closure 
from other responsible parties by characterizing those costs as 
"response costs" under CERCLA.76 This situation may arise 
where a party acquires a RCRA facility which had been con-
71. 33 u.s.c. § 2717(0(3). 
72. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
75. See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985); 
Commerce Holding Co., Inc. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
76. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Industr., Inc., 
669 F. Supp. 1285, 1289-1291 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 
600 F. Supp. 1049, 1053-1055 (D. Ariz. 1984) a{fd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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taminated by a previous owner. Although subsequent cleanups 
may be pursuant to a RCRA order, an owner or operator could 
characterize those costs as response costs and potentially recov-
er them under section 107 of CERCLA.77 
D. State Programs 
In addition to the federal statutes discussed above, several 
states have enacted laws providing for private recovery of envi-
ronmental response costs. In Utah, the Legislature passed a 
state superfund statute in 1989 known as the Hazardous Sub-
stance Mitigation Act (HSMA).78 The HSMA is considered a 
statute of "last resort." It authorizes the Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality to undertake cleanup and enforcement 
actions at potential hazardous waste sites in Utah only if the 
release cannot be cleaned up under any other statute. All reme-
dial investigations and actions under the HSMA must be con-
sistent with the substantive requirements of CERCLA and 
follow the procedures of the National Contingency Plan. 
Any expenses incurred by the Department of Environmen-
tal Quality in the abatement of an emergency release, remedial 
investigation, or remedial action may be recovered from respon-
sible parties. 79 A private party which incurs response costs in 
excess of its liability may seek to recover those costs from an-
other party who is or may be liable. Unlike CERCLA, the Act 
prohibits joint and several liability. Instead, the HSMA pro-
vides for contribution and requires the court to apportion costs 
based upon the responsible party's contribution to the release. 
The court may consider such equitable factors as the quantity, 
mobility, persistence, and toxicity of materials contributed, and 
the relative behavior of responsible parties contributing to the 
release. The burden of proving proportionate contribution is on 
each party. If a party does not prove its proportionate contribu-
tion, the HSMA directs the court or the Director of the Depart-
ment to apportion liability based upon available evidence and 
the standards set forth above.80 
77. See Mardan, 600 F. Supp. at 1049. 
78. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-301 to 19-6-325 (1991). 
79. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-310(1), 316(1), 318(1) (1991). 
80. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-310(2); § 19-6-316(2); 
§ 19-6-318(2) (1991). 
261] CERCLA COST RECOVERY 275 
Ill. COMMON LAW THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
In addition to the above statutory sources for cost recovery, 
there are several common law theories which may assist par-
ties in recovering the costs of environmental cleanups. These 
actions may be pursued either in addition to CERCLA or other 
statutory claims, or independently if the elements of the appli-
cable statute cannot be met. 
A. Nuisance 
Perhaps the most frequently used common law cause of 
action for relief from environmental harm is that of nuisance. 
Generally, an action in nuisance can provide both equitable 
relief and damages which result from the unlawful interference 
with the use and enjoyment of one's property. The elements of 
nuisance are: 
(1) Another person's conduct is the legal cause of an 
invasion of one's interest in the private use and enjoyment of 
land; and 
(2) The invasion is either intentional and unreason-
able; or unintentional but otherwise actionable under the rules 
controlling liability for negligent conduct, reckless conduct, o:r 
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities. 81 
In Utah, courts are generally more concerned with the 
nature and relative importance of the interests interfered with, 
than with the unreasonableness of the conduct leading to the 
invasion. The preeminent Utah case examining the application 
of nuisance in the environmental context is Branch v. Western 
Petroleum.82 In Branch, a petroleum company was found lia-
ble for nuisance and strict liability for oil waste products which 
had been placed in a waste pit and subsequently seeped into 
the groundwater ·of an adjacent landowner. In reaching this 
conclusion the court looked to the type and extent of the inva-
sion upon plaintiffs property interest and found it of no conse-
quence that defendant was engaged in a wholly legitimate 
business. 
The Branch court also recognized the doctrine of nuisance 
per se.83 Under this theory, if a defendant's conduct creates a 
81. RESI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
82. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982). 
83. ld. at 276. 
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nuisance and also violates a statutory prohibition, such conduct 
may constitute a nuisance per se without regard to the conduct 
or interests involved. In analyzing nuisance per se the reason-
ableness of defendant's conduct and the balancing of relative 
interests is immaterial because the Legislature has presumably 
intended to strike any such balancing in favor of the innocent 
party. 
B. Trespass 
A claim for trespass requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that a defendant or something in defendant's control has reck-
lessly or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally dangerous 
activity, entered the land belonging to another and caused 
harm to the land or the possessor.84 Although closely related, 
trespass is distinguishable from nuisance in that trespass re-
quires a physical invasion, while a nuisance generally interfers 
with a person's use and enjoyment of the land. In the context of 
pollution cases, these causes of action often overlap and a court 
may combine a trespass claim with a claim for nuisance. 
C. Negligence 
To recover on a claim of negligence, a potential plaintiff 
must show that: 
(1) The defendant had a legal duty or obligation to the 
plaintiff which required the defendant to conform to a standard 
of conduct that protects the plaintiff from unreasonable risks; 
(2) That the defendant failed to conform to that stan-
dard; 
(3) That the harm suffered was proximately caused by 
the defendant's failure to conform to the standard; and 
(4) That the plaintiffs person or property was actually 
injured or damaged. 85 
The doctrine of negligence is not commonly used in envi-
ronmental waste litigation because of the difficulties in proving 
defendant's duty to the plaintiff and causation of plaintiffs 
harm. 
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965). 
85. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
30 at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). 
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D. Strict Liability 
Strict liability is often characterized as liability regardless 
of fault. Under Utah law, persons who engage in abnormally 
dangerous activities may be strictly liable for damages proxi-
mately caused by that activity, independent of the presence or 
absence of any negligent conduct. The critical issue is deter-
mining whether the conduct leading to the environmental harm 
constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity. Courts may look 
not only to the type of activity involved, but also its proximity 
to adjacent property owners, risks associated with the activity, 
and public policy. In Branch, the Utah Supreme Court held the 
oil company strictly liable for polluting its neighbor's water 
wells because the company's disposal of formation water into 
the waste pit "constituted an abnormally dangerous and inap-
propriate use of the land in light of its proximity to the 
[neighbor's] property and was unduly dangerous to [their] use 
of their well water."86 The court also indicated that it may be 
more inclined to impose strict liability upon industrial polluters 
because industry "can and should assume the costs of pollution 
as a cost of doing business rather than charge the loss to a 
wholly innocent party."87 
IV. INSURANCE 
An additional method of recovering or minimizing the costs 
of environmental liabilities is through insurance. Increasingly, 
companies involved in environmental cleanups are turning to 
present and former insurers to recover costs incurred in con-
nection with such cleanups. However, because of the staggering 
costs associated with cleanups, adequate environmental cover-
age is often costly and difficult to obtain. 
The opportunity to recover environmental response costs 
depends largely upon the extent of coverage provided in alia-
bility insurance policy. If the policy either expressly excludes or 
includes environmental liability, then coverage issues should 
not arise. More commonly, coverage issues arise in determining 
whether a traditional Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) 
policy includes environmental harms. Since 1970, CGL policies 
have typically included a "pollution exclusion" that denies cov-
86. Branch, 657 P.2d at 274. 
87. !d. at 275. 
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erage for pollution claims unless the pollution was "sudden and 
accidental." Thus, immediate and unintentional releases typi-
cally will be covered under a CGL policy, but gradual or long-
term releases may not. 
Where ambiguities in an insurance policy exist, the general 
rule of construction is in favor of the insured. If a claim is cov-
ered, courts typically allow recovery of response costs which 
can be characterized as damages to property.88 However, 
where response costs are considered a mere economic loss or 
equitable "damages," courts are more likely to deny recovery. 89 
V. CONCLUSION 
In light of the potentially staggering costs associated with 
environmental response, it has become increasingly important 
for persons facing these costs to identify other responsible par-
ties to share the expense. Fortunately, several federal and state 
statutes, as well as common law theories, are available to as-
sist parties in recovering environmental response costs from 
others who share the responsibility. By using these 
mechanisms, parties who incur costs can attempt to inject some 
level of fairness into the system, and force those parties which 
bear the bulk of the responsibility for environmental contami-
nation to also bear the bulk of the cost. 
88. See Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. 
Cal. 1988). 
89. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 842 F.2d 977 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988). 
